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Realistic Local Job Multipliers
Timothy J. Bartik and Nathan Sotherland
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Improved estimates show
state and local job multipliers
are about one-quarter lower
than commonly assumed
by economic development
policymakers.
n Multipliers are lower
because commonly used
models do not adjust for how
job growth increases local land
prices, wages, and other costs.
n We estimate job multipliers
are similar regardless of
community or market size.
n Local job multipliers are
higher when the employed
share of the population
is lower.
n High-tech industries in hightech areas can have multipliers
twice as high as those of other
industries, reflecting greater
benefits of clustering near
other similar firms.
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Economic development policymakers often
claim large job multipliers. For the recent Amazon
project in New York, the claimed job multiplier
for New York State was 2.7—for every 100 jobs at
Amazon, 170 other jobs would result.
At the state level, job multipliers are often
claimed to be 2.5 to 4.0, while for local labor
markets, such as metropolitan areas, job multipliers
are claimed to be 2.0 or higher. High-tech
multipliers are sometimes claimed to be as great as
6—each high-tech job will create 5 other local jobs.
Correctly estimating the multiplier is important
because size does matter. Consider the benefits for
local residents from firms locating in their area
in exchange for tax incentives. Benefits include
increases in local employment-to-population
ratios. However, these benefits depend on total jobs
created, which scale roughly proportionately with
the multiplier. If the multiplier is twice as big, the
benefit-cost ratio will be twice as big.
Currently claimed multipliers rest on many
assumptions. Compared to prior models, we
take a more data-driven approach with fewer
assumptions, and, crucially, we allow for cost
feedbacks. When a local economy grows, local
costs (land prices, wages) rise. Higher local costs
repel other firms, lowering multipliers. Excluding
cost feedbacks could lead to overestimated
multipliers.
Our estimates lead to several important
findings:
1) Job multipliers are lower than commonly
assumed. We find job multipliers about onequarter lower than is often expected: at the
state level, around 2.0 rather than 2.7; at the
local level, around 1.5 rather than 2.0.
2) As a result, benefit-cost ratios for incentives
are lower. These new estimates imply benefitcost ratios for incentives that would be about
one-quarter lower.
3) Even smaller areas have similar multipliers.
Multipliers don’t increase for larger states

or larger local labor markets. Advantages of
larger size are offset by disadvantages; more
population might increase congestion.
4) Multipliers are localized. County multipliers
are only one-quarter below local labor market
multipliers. Local labor market multipliers are
only one-quarter below state multipliers.

Higher costs reduce the net
multiplier by one-quarter.
5) Multipliers increase with more available
labor. Local multipliers may be 5–15 percent
higher in local labor markets with a depressed
employment-to-population ratio.
6) High-tech multipliers are higher, but only
in areas with preexisting high-tech clusters.
High-tech multipliers in local labor markets
may be as high as 2.9, but only in areas with
significantly more high-tech clusters than the
national average. High-tech clusters benefit
high-tech firms by allowing workers and ideas
to migrate from one firm to another.
How Multipliers Evolve
Creating jobs at a new or expanded facility may
immediately spur the creation of other jobs in the
area for two reasons:
1) Supplier linkages. The new or expanded
facility may purchase from local suppliers,
increasing these suppliers’ sales and their need
for more workers.
2) Worker demand. Workers at the new
or expanded facility, and workers at the
facility’s suppliers, may spend money at local
restaurants, brewpubs, grocery stores, hardware
stores, farmers’ markets, clothing stores, yoga
studios, etc. This local spending will in turn
create jobs in these service industries. In
addition, some of these goods and services
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will be produced locally (beer from
breweries, produce from farmers,
yoga instructors from a nearby
college), which will also generate
local jobs.
However, these initial job effects can
eventually produce broader impacts,
both good and bad:
• Cost feedbacks. Job growth
increases demand for local
land and labor, which will
consequently increase land
prices and wages. As a result,
other businesses will find it more
expensive to hire workers or rent
a building. These increased costs
will discourage job creation.
• Agglomeration economies or
industry cluster spillovers. For
some industries and areas, a
greater concentration of similar
jobs or workers may increase
productivity. In high-tech
industries, especially, ideas
(and workers) may move
between firms. Higher
productivity will make the area

more competitive for adding
jobs.
How do these factors play out
over time? The supplier and worker
demand effects begin immediately but
continue to increase as local suppliers
and retailers gear up production. The
negative effects of cost feedbacks take
longer to become apparent, as firms
only gradually adjust their job creation
decisions in response to higher costs.
Cluster spillovers, when they’re
present, also take some time to occur.
Figure 1 shows our estimates of how
the typical local job multiplier evolves
over time. The immediate multiplier
is 1.4: for every 100 jobs created at a
new or expanded facility, another 40
local jobs would also be created very
quickly. This multiplier expands over
the next two years to 1.9, due to the
creation of another 50 jobs as local
suppliers, retailers, and other serviceproviders respond to the increased
demand for their wares. However, the
negative effects of higher costs then
begin to kick in. These higher costs
destroy about 40 jobs, reducing the net

Figure 1 Local Job Multiplier
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multiplier after five years to 1.5. The
multiplier approximately stabilizes after
this point.
Because most current estimates of
the job multiplier ignore cost feedback
effects, they conclude that the multiplier
is 1.9 or 2.0, about one-fourth higher
than the true long-run multiplier.
Differences in Multipliers
These multiplier estimates are for
a local labor market, which we define
as the commuting zone—groups of
U.S. counties within which there is
significant commuting. What about
other types of areas?
At the state level, the long-run
multiplier is about one-quarter higher,
at 1.9 rather than 1.5 (Table 1). States
are big enough to include more
suppliers. In addition, if the new jobs
create some fiscal benefits, the state
government may cut taxes or increase
spending, boosting the state economy.
At the smaller, county level, the
long-run multiplier is about onequarter lower, at 1.1 rather than 1.5.
Some of the supplier and service jobs
created in the commuting zone will be
outside the county in which the new
or expanded facility is located, thus
lowering the county multiplier.
However, across commuting zones
of different sizes, we find similar longrun multipliers. This is surprising.
Wouldn’t larger commuting zones have
more suppliers and retailers whose
job creation would be stimulated? Yes,
but larger commuting zones also have
more problems with higher costs and
congestion. As a larger commuting
zone gets more jobs, land may become
scarcer, roads more crowded, etc.
These congestion effects reduce the
multiplier. Apparently, the advantages
of more suppliers and retailers in larger
commuting zones are roughly offset by
the larger congestion costs. As a result,
even smaller commuting zones can
count on at least some multiplier effects.
Besides the size of the area,
multipliers are affected also by
local labor supply conditions. In
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The Advantages of More
Flexible Models
We have calculated all these
multipliers using a strategy relying
on national increases in demand for
an area’s specialized industries. This
strategy imposes few assumptions and
allows the data to drive the estimation.
In contrast, the predominant
approach used by most economic
development policymakers is regional
input-output models. These models
rely on national relationships of the
inputs industries purchase from each
other, as well as how much workers
buy from retailers and other stores. The
models then apply assumptions about
the proportions of these purchases
that come from local suppliers and
retailers. These assumptions may not
be correct, and there is no guarantee
that relationships that hold nationally
also hold for a given local area. Most
importantly, however, regional inputoutput models do not allow for any
negative impacts from higher local
costs. Yet, our results show such
negative cost feedback is important,
reducing long-run job multipliers by
roughly one-quarter.

Table 1 Long-Term Job Multipliers
Commuting zones

States

Counties

Baseline assumptions

1.5

1.9

1.1

Low employment rates

1.6

High-tech jobs in high-tech cluster

2.9

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

What Is Needed: Realistic Multipliers
Large multipliers are not magic pixie
dust that should be sprinkled on every
economic development project to give it
a large payoff. Job multipliers certainly
exist: an economic development project
that directly creates jobs will also
induce some additional, local spinoff
jobs. But the number of these spinoff
jobs is less than is often claimed.
What should policymakers
do? When evaluating projects, we
recommend that the multipliers from
regional input-output models should be
scaled back. Does the project still make
sense if the job multiplier is one-quarter
to one-third less than the number
“estimated” by a regional input-output
model?

More generally, we need to invest
in developing better estimates of job
multipliers and applying them under
diverse circumstances. We hope our
paper will lead to further work that
helps inform policymakers about
what multipliers might be realistic for
different industries in different local
economies.
This article draws on research from an
Upjohn Institute working paper, which can
be found at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/301.
Support for this project was provided by the Pew
Charitable Trusts. The views expressed are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Pew Charitable Trusts.

Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist, and Nathan
Sotherland a senior research analyst, at the Upjohn
Institute.

Figure 2 High-Tech Multiplier in Areas with Different Current High-Tech Clusters
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commuting zones with a lower share
of the population aged 25–54 in
employment—the so-called prime-age
employment-to-population ratio—the
multiplier is slightly higher, at 1.6 rather
than 1.5.
Furthermore, some industries have
higher multipliers than others. For
example, multipliers can be significantly
higher for high-tech industries, at
2.9 rather than 1.5. This only holds,
however, in commuting zones that
already have significantly above-average
high-tech clusters: commuting zones
whose high-tech employment share is
in the top one-fifth of all commuting
zones (Figure 2). In more average
commuting zones, with a more average
high-tech industry share, the hightech job multiplier is only 1.7, which
is close to the average multiplier for all
industries.
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[Job] Locked and [Un]loaded
The Effect of the Affordable Care Act Dependency Mandate
on Reenlistment in the U.S. Army
Michael S. Kofoed and Wyatt J. Frasier
One concern that policymakers
have regarding employer-sponsored
health insurance is “job lock” and its
effects on labor markets. Workers value
health benefits, but health benefits are
not transferable across jobs. Thus, a
worker could want to pursue a more
desirable job opportunity but may
choose not to because that worker
might lose her health insurance
coverage. This condition could cause
a worker to forgo career satisfaction
or promotion or advancement.
Policymakers worry about this
phenomenon because it may limit
worker effectiveness and lower the
incentive toward entrepreneurship.
One goal of the Affordable Care
Act (ACA), passed in 2010, is to
increase the portability of health
insurance across jobs. In our study, we
examine the effect of the dependent
mandate (in which young adults under
26 years old are permitted to remain
on their parents’ health insurance)
on reenlistment rates for soldiers in
the U.S. Army, a relatively healthy
group for whom we can observe many
characteristics typically not available
for private-sector workers. We use

variation from the policy change to
compare soldiers aged 23–25 to those
aged 27–30. We compare these groups
before and after the passage of the
ACA. While the younger group gains
access to their parents’ health insurance
after ACA enactment—even if they
leave the army—the older group does
not. This difference-in-differences
approach allows us to estimate the
causal effect of having health insurance
from an external source—one’s
parents—on reenlistment of activeduty military members in the army.
We find that reenlistment rates were
similar for soldiers aged 23–25 and 27–
30 before the ACA, but once soldiers
under 26 became eligible for their
parents’ health insurance, the younger
soldiers began to leave the army at a
rate 5 percent higher than before the
policy change, while rates for the older
soldiers did not change appreciably.
Moreover, the increase in leaving was
concentrated among soldiers with
higher test scores. It appears that
flexibility achieved through the ACA
may be bad for the firm (in this case
the U.S. Army) because it is losing
some of its most talented employees

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n We test whether access to parents’ health insurance led soldiers to not reenlist in
the army.
n The ACA allowed people under age 26 to stay on their parents’ health insurance.
n We compare soldiers aged 23–25, who gained access, to soldiers aged 27–30, who
did not.
n We find the younger soldiers’ reenlistment rates fell 5 percent relative to the older
soldiers’ rates.
n Younger soldiers leaving were more likely to enroll in college, possibly helping their
job opportunities.

4

once job lock is removed. However,
the outcomes may be positive for the
overall labor market and for affected
individuals, who now have greater
ability to pursue additional education
and/or labor market prospects.
Background
Analyzing “job lock”—that fear of
losing health benefits prevents workers
from easily changing jobs, attending
college, or starting a business—is
difficult with traditional survey data
because important considerations
such as the health status of the worker,
differences in insurance generosity, and
whether a worker quit or was fired are
generally unknown. However, the U.S.
Army serves as a perfect “laboratory”
for this question.
Through affiliation with the United
States Military Academy, we have
access to detailed data regarding
soldiers and dependents from the
Office of Economic and Manpower
Analysis. In our data, we observe a
soldier from the day she joins the army
to the day she separates. Our office has
begun to link these data to those from
other federal agencies to understand
what happens when a soldier leaves the
army. When a soldier joins the army,
she signs a contract that binds her to
the military for between three and six
years. During military service, soldiers
must maintain strict health and fitness
requirements, but they receive free
health insurance (called TRICARE)
and are compensated at the same fixedrate schedule (within pay grade). At
the end of an enlistment contract, the
army evaluates the solider and her job
performance and then decides whether
to make an offer of reenlistment;
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Divergence in Reenlistment Rates
We compare reenlistment rates for
two age groups of soldiers—those 23–
25 and those 27–30—before and after
implementation of the ACA. Figure
1 shows the average reenlistment rate
for each group for every year in our
sample. The blue line represents our
“treatment group” of soldiers who are
23–25, while the green line represents
our “control group” of soldiers who are
27–30. Before the ACA, younger and
older soldiers reenlisted (when offered
the opportunity) at nearly the same
rates. After 2010, however, younger
soldiers began to reenlist at a much
lower rate, and this effect appears to
persist over time. For the army, this
meant reenlistments fell by more than
3,200 soldiers, requiring additional
costs and time to recruit and train
replacements. But can we attribute the
fall in reenlistment rates to the ACA, or
did it stem from something else?
One concern about these visual
findings is that different characteristics
of the soldiers could be driving the
results. However, when we control for
the soldier’s gender, race, home state,
and education level, our findings do
not change at all. Another concern
could be differences in reenlistment
bonuses. In the army, soldiers of the
same rank, branch, and month of
contract expiration are assigned the
same bonus. We included a control
that allowed us to compare soldiers
of similar rank and branch who differ
only in age. While the magnitude of
our result shrinks slightly, it remains
sizable.
It is also possible our findings
are a result of deaths in Iraq and
Afghanistan. For example, if casualties

spike because of an increase in
violence, younger soldiers may
become more risk averse and less
likely to reenlist. Alternatively, because
unemployment was increasing during
the Great Recession at the same time
that the ACA took effect, some older
soldiers may have been more likely to
reenlist to avoid a difficult job market.
Additionally, since some states were
expanding Medicaid during this
period, we may worry about how
the generosity of the home state’s
welfare programs affected the decision
to reenlist. However, when we add
controls for each of these factors, our
core results remain unchanged.
Finally, because the Great Recession
led to an onslaught of new regulations
and laws, the change in reenlistment
rates could instead be affected by a
policy change other than the ACA.
To check this possibility, we simulate
two “pretend” or “placebo” changes.
First, we compare reenlistment rates
of soldiers aged 27–30 with those
aged 30–33; since neither age group
was affected by the ACA, we would
not expect their reenlistment rates

to change differently. Second, we
compare the original early 20s and
late 20s age groups, but we pretend
that Congress passed the ACA in
2008 instead of 2010. Since this did
not actually happen, we would not
expect reenlistment rates to change
differentially in 2008 and 2009.

After ACA passage in 2010, younger
soldiers began to reenlist at a lower
rate, and this effect appears to
persist over time.
Indeed, when we change the ages of the
treatment groups or the timing of the
policy change, our results disappear.
Thus, like a combination on a locker,
we see changes in reenlistment rates
only when we combine the right
age group that was affected by the
policy with the correct year in which
the policy change occurred. These
“placebo” tests are evidence that our
results are a consequence of the ACA
and not some other outside influence.

Figure 1 Reenlistment for Soldiers Aged 23–25 and 27–30, 2007–2013
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if offered, the soldier then chooses
whether to reenlist or separate. These
institutional characteristics allow us
to control for many factors that could
affect a person’s employment decision
that are not available in traditional
labor market data.
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The Key to Job Lock?
To show that the decrease in
reenlistment is a product of job lock,
it would be helpful to understand
whether soldiers are leaving the army
for increased opportunities, such
as higher-paying jobs or additional
schooling. Unfortunately, we have not
linked our army data with income data,

While our results may be
discouraging for the U.S. Army,
they may be positive for
individuals and the labor market.
but we can access GI Bill usage from
the Department of Veterans Affairs.
We find that soldiers who have access
to their parents’ health insurance are
about 1 percentage point more likely to
use their GI Bill benefits, from a base
of 53 percent. This result shows that,
with the increase in separate health
coverage, soldiers are leaving the army
for educational opportunities.
Our findings present an interesting
conundrum for the Department of
Defense and health care policymakers
that might not be unique to the
military. For example, we also find
that the drop in reenlistment rates of
younger soldiers who subsequently use
their GI Bill benefits is concentrated
among those with the highest military
standardized test scores, suggesting
that employers may be losing some
of their most talented employees
once job lock is removed. This loss
is particularly painful for the army
because the military does not allow
“lateral” hires (i.e., management from
outside the organization) among its
active-duty personnel. For the army
to have future senior leaders—from
senior noncommissioned officers
to colonels and generals—it cannot
simply hire managers from the private
sector, but must grow them from
20-year-olds who start their careers as
privates (if enlisted) or lieutenants (if

6

commissioned officers). Thus, the army
will need to increase its recruiting and
retention spending to ensure that it
manages its talent efficiently.
However, while our results may
be discouraging for the U.S. Army,
they may be positive for individuals
and the labor market. We provide
evidence that the ACA decreased labor
market frictions from job lock. Once
health insurance becomes portable
(through eligibility for a parent’s
plan), the soldier—and possibly other
employees—can now afford to pursue

acquiring additional human capital
that may lead to better job prospects.
This article draws on research from an
Upjohn Institute working paper, which can
be found at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/300/.
The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and do not reflect the position of the
United States Military Academy, the Department
of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

Michael S. Kofoed is an assistant professor at the
United States Military Academy. Wyatt J. Frasier is
an officer in the U.S. Army.

Upjohn Institute Report Offers Ideas To Help
Communities Build Broadly Shared Prosperity
In 2018, the Upjohn Institute launched an initiative to learn how
communities can help residents get and keep good jobs. Called “Promise:
Investing in Community,” the initiative marshaled Institute research
expertise in place-based
college scholarships, workforce
development and training, tax
incentives, and customized
business services.
This three-year initiative
marks its first year with a report
that summarizes what we’ve
learned to date. The report,
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Download the report for free at https://bit.ly/20bcmnL.
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